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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Ralph Nader*
Thank you very much, Dean Uelmen, ladies and gentlemen. As
you are well aware, the title of the conference is The Future of Tort
Litigation in California. California is such a large state that one is
entitled to put it in a national context because what happens here
not only reflects what may happen around the country, but often
initiates it.

I would like to begin by discussing the function of tort law,
because I think the misconception of what it really does is at the root
of many, at least theoretical, assaults on it. What we are really talking about is the use of the law to both compensate and deter violence
to person and property, to widen the respect in the civic philosophy
that underlies the law and is nourished by it, and to widen the respect for the physical integrity of human beings. I view a democracy
based on three pillars: civil liberties, civil rights and safety or security rights. And certainly there has been a very broad theoretical development of civil rights and civil liberties-not enough of such development for safety rights. Furthermore, where there has been a
theoretical development of safety rights in recent years, post-Prosser
and post-Seavey, this has been a development that is notable for its
empirical starvation.
As I view the evolution of public and private safety standards
and the kinds of stimuli that provoke people and industry to upgrade
their standards, their warnings, it is clear that the functions of the
tort system are at least fourfold. The first is the one most focused on,
which is a compensatory function. The second is a deterrent function. The third is as disclosure and public information, and the
fourth is an ethical expansion function relating to the impact between the powerful and the weak. Most of the attention and attack
on the tort system has been based on its evaluation as a compensatory mechanism, almost totally ignoring its deterrence, disclosure and
ethical expansion functions. And I want to discuss briefly the last
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three functions.
You only have to speak to a corporate counsel or a safety engineer in any industrial corporation to appreciate the effect of insecurity stemming from a potential jury verdict or tort action on their
sense of what is prudent. To the extent they think they are invulnerable to the reach of the tort arm, to the extent they think they will
not be penetrated by the discovery procedures, they' will rest on their
oars. Intra-corporate memos will not be full of cautions and recommendations and urgings couched in language the corporate executives understand, rather, the unanticipated imposition of an unbudgeted cost coupled with widely expanded public scrutiny of what
they have been doing.
I would like to see more studies on the deterrent function.
These studies have to be funded. The sources of funding for existing
studies, with few exceptions, are designed to attack and undermine
the tort system, to show its weaknesses, not to show its strengths.
But, based on much observation and access to internal company
memos and conversations with corporate executives and corporate
lawyers, I have little doubt that the greatest deterrent impact of the
tort law system is what they choose not to do in terms of taking
risks. That the anecdotal data which is being brought together-showing post-verdict modifications on motorcycles and motor vehicles, etcetera-that those are only a tip of the iceberg of the
deterrent function of the tort system.
The argument is often made that the tort system impedes the
development of new products. There is not much evidence for that,
even in the celebrated beta-blocker allusions-not much evidence at
all. The tort system functions the way the insurance system should
function, as a screening device against products that are too risky to
be brought to market and products that have to be modified and improved before their sale is continued. This is the ideal function of
both of those systems. As I will note in a few minutes, the insurance
function has had other orientations in recent decades.
The disclosure and information function is another very poorly
understood contribution of tort law. If you look at the major headlines relating to traumas based on corporate products in the last
twenty years-headlines like the Pinto fuel tank, the Firestone radial
tire, the Dalkon shield and its hundreds of thousands of mutilated
victims, the asbestos predation and its hundreds of thousands of casualties and many other similar celebrated, notorious products-you
ask yourself, where did all that information come from that was conveyed in summary form, from time to time through television, radio,
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newspapers and magazines? It did not come from the regulatory
agencies, the agencies that have the ability and the authority to get
this information, nor from the political will. This information came
from law suits, discovery procedures, depositions, interrogatories,
cross-examinations, etcetera.
As a result, millions of people were notified before being
harmed of the quantitative significance of these products. They were
enabled to take their precautions, demand corrective legislation or
regulatory standards. They could lose their sense of innocence about
what modern industry and its leaders are capable of doing or not
doing. The disclosure and information function gives us a lot of data
for scholarly analysis, for historical analysis, for sociological analysis.
It starts a grapevine of concern throughout the country. It is a warning system, and to the extent that it has a public relations sting, it
carries with it a deterrent consequence.
The ethical evaluation is even less recognized. We ask ourselves
where in our society is there a reservoir for authoritative advancement of proper ethical relationships between corporations and consumers, corporations and workers, corporations and communities,
between the technology of industry and the rights of future generations? It's difficult to find a reservoir that is more consistent and
more productive than the appellate decisions in tort law over the last
hundred years or so.
Where is the other reservoir? One may say religion-how authoritative is that in terms of changing the behavior of General Motors? From many a pulpit comes the elucidation of the golden rule. I
don't think it reaches Roger Smith and other G.M. executives in
terms of altering their behavior.
Where else-government safety standards? Yes, to some degree.
These are often very attenuated by the time they are issued, very late
by the time they are issued, and very obsolete in a few years. The
tire safety standard issued in 1968 is twenty-two years old. It was a
consensus standard, incomplete at the time, and has not been updated since. Almost all the tires bought now attain standards beyond
it. In other words, it doesn't even function as a lowest common denominator in terms of having evidence of a few tires falling at or
underneath that standard. So, it is basically an historical exhortation,
rather than a safety standard.
Congressional hearings? They do something like that; they try
to widen the ethical ambit of proper relationships between perpetrators and victims. But they are not very authoritative either because
they deliver their message to an incentive system that changes behav-
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ior, priorities, investment allocations and the like.
Consider the decision by Learned Hand in the T.J. Hooper
case, which repudiated the state of the art argument by tugboat operators who didn't have radios and couldn't receive warnings of approaching storms, and they said, "Well, all the tugboat operators
don't have radios, or most of them don't." Learned Hand said,
"Well, most of them should." That started a whole train of judicial
decisions that stripped the negligent company of its comfortable rationalization, that they could continue to be negligent because the
rest of the industry behaves similarly. Some of the most venerable
and wisest establishments of proper relationships in the critical area
of physical integrity of human beings and their property have come
from these appellate decisions. And I must say, as far as I can see,
the common law that emanates from these decisions and affirmations
is the greatest single reservoir trying to cope with the complexities
and the impacts of modern technology, the health, safety, and property rights of individuals. That is a very important public asset.
In an alternative no-fault workman's compensation scheme, the
compensation doesn't reflect community values. It begins to reflect
political values. The jury is out of the equation. Workman's compensation is no longer a deterrent system; it's frozen. Workman's compensation doesn't disclose much in terms of internal corporate behavior, memos or cover-ups. Workman's compensation is an ethical dead
end. It doesn't attract the most imaginative minds or the most intense
endeavors of advocacy.
We should always keep in mind when we evaluate the tort system and consider how it can be improved, its infirmities and place it
in the proper historical context so that more than law students and
law professors and lawyers can begin to understand it. I am being
charitable when I assume that law students understand it, because
they often take that first year course and never look back. And they
are increasingly taught by professors whose minds have become
monetized by the Chicago School and who have been so empirically
starved for so long that it is one of the wonders of the academic
world that they are still physically articulating themselves in front of
a classroom.
Now, in terms of the management of violence, either industrial,
commercial or governmental, that we call torts, there are other systems. There is the criminal law-we know how widely that is applied-which in our country is still based on the individual behavioral model of street crime. It has very, very little application to
corporate crime. Crime in the streets-yes, it applies in some fash-
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ion. Crime in the suites-there just aren't any prosecutorial resources available. The prosecution of Ford Motor Company in a
small town in Indiana on a Pinto incineration case a few years ago
was launched with $21,000, the largest budget to date by that prosecutor. Ford spent over 2 million dollars including retaining the former law partner of the judge in that small town. It was hardly a
contest.
I recommend a new book written by the sociologist, Donald
Black called Sociological Law, Oxford University Press, 1989. It is a
small book; he always writes small books-very, very analytic, distilled books in terms of showing that like cases are not treated in like
fashion and the very important factors that decide judicial outcomes
depending on whether individuals sue individuals or individuals sue
organizations or organizations sue individuals or organizations sue
other organizations, not to mention economic, ethnic and other statuses that are cranked into the equation.
There are also the regulatory agencies. These, as I have noted,
are too little and too late. Sometimes they perform rather single accomplishments, usually right after the legislation is passed in the
first flush years of the regulatory agency, and certainly regulation
has something to do with the final victory which will lead to the
installation of air bags in cars and prevent hundreds of thousands of
casualties. I think litigation had a little bit to do with it too, but it
was the technology of the air bag that was most effective and its
superb performance in the models in which it has been installed over
the years.
Besides the criminal law and the regulatory standards in the
tort system, there are many informal sources of feedback. There are
some managers who take ethics seriously and perform a little differently and better. Sometimes there is private marketplace feedback
that sends a particular message. I suppose now the apple crop and
the apple growers are experiencing reduced sales following the
Meryl-Streep-supported report and all the publicity dealing with
alar and apple juice, apples and applesauce and the exposure of infants to that carcinogen. But, taking these all together, I think we
still see a big vacuum that I am particularly pleased to see is being
filled to some degree or another by the torts system.
Now, having said that, let's ask a quantitative question. Of all
the people in this country who are killed, injured or exposed to disease due to the negligence or worse behavior of perpetrators, how
many of them get compensation under the tort system? This has
often been misinterpreted as a reason for the no-fault system. The
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reason why most of them don't get compensated, such as in medical
malpractice, is: first, they don't know that medical malpractice exists
because the doctor isn't likely to tell them immediately-especially
with a wrongfully prescribed antibiotic or an unnecessary operation
or what have you. Secondly, even if they do know, there are certain
personal deterrents here. They don't want to sue the family doctor;
they don't want to go through the anguish; and they are told in
many ways that the percentages are against them. Third, when they
finally reach a lawyer, the lawyer will look at the case and decide
what are the probabilities and what are the possible damages. So,
many smaller cases don't get adequately represented in the presently
structured system, and as the expense of litigation increases, the
smaller cases don't get lawyers. And then when they go to trial, and
they go to a jury, the system is also stacked. Where are the experts
coming from? How many doctors can the doctor get compared to
how many doctors you can get as expert witnesses? What about the
command of the data? What actually went on in the hospital room is
not easy to obtain.
We also have to look at the economies of the tort system and see
how we can become more efficient, present more store-front representation of victims with smaller levels of damages, various products
liability and malpractice actions in other areas. There is nothing that
says the tort system's present mode of representation cannot come
into the modern age with an expanded proliferation of efficiencies
and service working on a volume of smaller cases. And there's no
reason why the costs of negligence or criminal behavior -should not
be more widely imposed on the perpetrators so that these costs are
internalized and they generate their own corrective behavior. The
anesthesiologist, I think, now will admit that malpractice cases over
the past generation have worked wonders in improving the safety of
the practice of anesthesiology. And, indeed, the data show this in
terms of the decline in fatalities and other injuries due to the application of anesthesia prior to an operation.
Now we come, of course, to the problem of the tort system
under attack and why it is under attack. The insurance companies
are attacking it because they have ceased to be engineering underwriting institutions, and they have become financial institutions, or
as I like to put it colloquially, financial cash cows feeding the public
a lot of bull.
In years past, some chapters of their underwriting successes
have included the Lloyds of London requirements in the 17th and
18th century that ships to the Orient be equipped with life boats and
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that lighthouses be constructed to reduce the likelihood of ships sinking to the spectacular improvement in industrial boiler safety due to
the rigorous standards and pre-conditions set by the insurance companies for underwriting policies purchased by factories. But, in recent decades, a new orientation has beset the insurance industry:
they are now more attuned to trying to invest money in order to
expand their investment income than they are to loss prevention.
They would rather get a $1,000 premium from you and pay you
$500 than get a $500 premium and pay you $250 because there is
more money to put away for investment income. There is almost a
reverse incentive now. One gets the impression that as long as there
is an ever escalating ceiling of permissible rate increases, the casualty
insurance industry would not care at all about efforts to prevent in'juries, death, disease and property damage. Now that this escalating
ceiling is not escalating as rapidly, because of public resistance,
you're seeing an extraordinary expansion of lip service in recent
months by the insurance companies for loss prevention.
Where were they? Where were they when we were trying to
get a motor vehicle safety law through in the sixties, which finally
was enacted and has saved over 170,000 lives and millions of injuries? Where were they when the speed limit went up to 65 m.p.h.,
even though their own studies and reports showed thousands of additional casualties? Where were they when Mr. Reagan acceded to the
will of G.M. in the early eighties and reduced the bumper standard
from a mere 5 m.p.h. protective level to 2.5, instead of advancing it
to 7 or 8 and preventing billions of dollars of fender bender collision
expenses, which now the insurance companies tell us is one of the
reasons for their need to expand rates? Where were they when the
states were repealing motorcycle helmet laws and creating legions of
paraplegics, quadraplegics? Where were they when groups would
beg them to be active in fire prevention and they'd look the other
way, causing one Harvard scholar to observe that they need a certain
number of fires in order to create the economic demand for more
comprehensive' and expensive fire insurance?
The industry was a cost plus business until Proposition 103 was
enacted-exempt from the state and federal antitrust laws, exempt
from federal regulation, subordinated to the weakest type of state
regulation, and, until 1986, exempt in reality from federal tax laws.
The Government Accounting Office noted that the property casualty
insurance companies made 81 billion dollars in the decade between
1975 and 1986, paid not a cent in federal income tax, and received a
1.2 billion dollar credit. This is a highly pampered and a highly
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exempted industry which has allowed its worst commercial instincts
to dominate its orientation toward the world of injury, sickness and
property damage. And so, it was not surprising that every time the
insurance cycle comes around, following a period of high interest
rates, suddenly beginning to decline that they have never lost money,
but a decline in their rate of return. This reached rock bottom in
1984, about a 3.2% rate of return. Then they had to suddenly increase rates to start that upward scale of that decade long cycle and,
in order to increase the rates, they had to find someone to blame.
They, of course, did not want to blame themselves, their inefficiency, their waste, their hierarchical managements, their wrongheaded actuarial practices. The actuarial practices are designed to
maximize their revenue, not to reflect actuary reality, such as the
low credit they give to good driving records compared to territorial
presence, so they started blaming judges, juries, lawyers, and those
nasty, determined victims who wanted to bring them to justice.
Aetna, which has always been the first in the mad dog race
attacking the tort system and the civil jury system, unleashed a series
of characterizations, or shall we say caricatures, of the civil justice
system that even the most adept Kremlin propagandist would have
been proud. They are continuing to do that now with wild misstatements of cases, cases that were reversed, set aside by the judges, the
verdicts caricatured. Indeed, in the mid-seventies there was even a
case, attributed of course to California, in which they said a man
picked up a power lawn mower and started cutting his shrubbery-strong man-cut himself and got a nice big verdict. When I
wrote to the insurance executives asking them for the citation for this
remarkable case, they finally wrote to me saying there was no such
case. It was fictitious. And yet these phony anecdotes found their
way into the repertoire of the master of phony anecdotes, Ronald
Reagan, when in 1986 he commended to Congress that Congress
preempt common law products liability, codify it and put a $100,000
lifetime cap for pain and suffering. I read his message carefully. I
noted he did not ask for any cap on insurance executives' salaries, it
was just a cap on a lifetime of pain and suffering. Now this attack
made some headway, and legislators rushed to their desks to pass
tort reform legislation.
It is an interesting phrase-tort reform. I wish they were trying
to prevent torts, as Harvey Levine said, "Is it proper: 'tort reform'?"
And the contest was on all over the country. Now, mind you, we
were in a period of corporate prosperity, record corporate profits
year after year, record corporate executive bonuses and salaries, and
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this is the way they chose to deal with the most vulnerable people in
our society. It is not enough they destroy the regulatory performance
in Washington, which prevents death and injury by having stronger
and more up to date safety standards. After destroying the regulatory
part of the law's respect and safeguard of the health and safety of
individuals, they turned around to try to make it even more difficult
for those who were injured and the next of kin of those killed to have
their day in court. And they did it on the most pernicious of realms.
They did not do it on the basis of quantitative data, because the
quantitative data contradicted them, including the Rand Institute
studies out of Santa Monica. In 1985, Rand estimated that the million tort cases filed that year would have a cost of twenty-seven to
thirty-four billion dollars. That's twenty-seven to thirty-four billion
for all the tort cases filed in all the courts of law in the United
States. Let's put that in perspective. Here is a cluster of dollars
which is being transferred between different parties. That twentyseven to thirty-four billion included not only settlements and verdicts
but claims processing costs by the insurance companies, the fees of
the lawyers on both sides and a per hour estimate of the litigant's
time. Now, that is a pretty important area of American society to
spend money on compensating injured and sick people. And we can
all find ways for how it can be done more efficiently, more expeditiously. But even taking that twenty-seven to thirty-,four billion, let
us compare that with other clusters of expenditures: thirty-three billion on cosmetics, forty billion on soft drinks, sixty-two billion on
alcohol, one hundred and four billion on General Motors products,
not to mention the Defense Department, which rounds off its contracts to the nearest billion dollar.
Breaking it down in a more micro way creates all this uproar
about too much money being paid out for medical malpractice-it
was less than two billion dollars in 1986. The premium itself for
hospitals and doctors was about three or three point five billion dollars. How much is two billion dollars? There are over 400,000 serious cases of malpractice, probably much more, but let's make it easy.
When you talk about unnecessary hysterectomies, unnecessary caesarean sections, and other unnecessary operations, you are way over
400,000. Let us take 400,000. In 1986, 18,000 victims of medical
malpractice did not receive any -money whatsoever by verdict and
settlement. How much is less than two billion dollars? We spent two
point seven billion dollars in 1986 on cat food. I don't see any social
attack on that expenditure. How about products liability, where
there is almost as big of an uproar. At the most, the best estimates
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we have-extrapolating from a number of the data collection centers
such as jury verdicts research, etcetera-is less than two billion dollars in verdicts and settlement transfers in products liability cases.
They are very hard to bring, very hard to win, and very few lawyers
know how to handle them. The information is very cloistered.
So, put the malpractice and the products liability together, and
you have a total compensation transfer to injured people that is less
than the post-tax profits of Ford Motor Company that year-one
company. So, why the outcry? Why the outcry when the National
Industrial Conference Board, an industry-funded representative
board for pursuing studies on the economy, came out with a report
over two years ago, based on a poll of risk reduction officers of corporations, concluding that there was no real serious product liability
crisis. This was, of course what Business Week was reporting all
along: that the main impact of products liability laws was to make
the products safer. These are the people in the company who know.
Why the outcry?
It isn't because of the compensation burden. It's because of the
other three functions of the tort system. It's because of deterrence in
the sense of reaching the board of directors and restructuring corporations like John Manville and A.J. Robbins. The arm of the tort
law is reaching up, up, up into the principal segments of the board
and officer corps of these corporations. Some of them have to leave, a
lot of them have to be deposed, and they don't like that kind of interference. They would rather have these messy things handled by some
lower functionaries: out of sight, out of mind, out of public glare, out
of any analysis of how the corporate structure diffuses responsibility
and covers up. They are also very concerned about unloading their
internal files for public review and media promotion.
They also don't like the idea of expanding their obligations.
They now have a duty to warn-got to put it on the label, got to
expose yourself. They have to check their scientists; they have to
check their chemicals. These executives like routine. They use the
word "predictability." They don't like to have their golf game disturbed on weekends. Litigation upsets them in that way and the economic cost is trivial. It is, in fact, too trivial, given the compensation
transfer needs of victims who get nothing. That is why the insurance
industry, among others, needs to be re-structured toward loss prevention, toward putting its rating function, its political and economic
muscle behind regulatory standards, behind conditioning the insurance of the workplace or of a particular model car or a pharmaceutical in terms of levels of safety. That is what we are trying to do.
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That is what we are going to succeed in doing, and already the insurance companies are trying to nestle up to consumer groups in
Washington and California in order to develop joint statements on
loss prevention and concern for safety. We have reached the rhetorical state now. And the next one will be the commitment of political
and economic resources.
The ethical growth that comes from the expansion of the common law of torts is currently, given the political complexion of our
country, the only opportunity we have to control the unbridled production and commercial technologies, many arising with no controls
whatsoever. For example, genetic engineering-no regulatory controls whatsoever. What is the relation of the tort system to the insurance system? Until recently, it has been primarily a very, very adversarial one. The insurance system is built on the premise of
charging consumers more and making sure that they collect less.
That is not a very creative use of the insurance function.
The re-insurance function, represented by Lloyds of London as
the leader in the re-insurance market, is even more indifferent and
callous. Our tort system is being subjected to a bombardment by foreign based re-insurance companies that are the lead in developing
policies for re-insurance and are followed by U.S. re-insurance companies. The tort system is being bombarded to depress its protection
of the rights of victims down to the lowest British common denominator and then who knows from then on-maybe to the lowest Korean common denominator.
Lloyds of London's legal representatives made no secret of this
in statements they have made at conferences and hearings since
1985. In Alaska, at a conference on the tort system, the representative of Lloyds submitted a list of twenty-seven reform items, substantive and procedural, which would have corroded and undermined
100 years of common law progress and would have brought our system closer to the British system, a system that forgets about the jury,
forgets about pain and suffering, compensation, forgets about punitive damages, forgets about the contingent fee. It is best illustrated by
the Oroflex or Oprin cases-a drug produced by Eli Lilly which
damaged thousands of people in Britain, horrible skin and liver
damage. A year ago they settled the first batch of cases after five
years of litigation. The average settlement figure was $3,100. In the
United States there were settlements and verdicts ranging from
$250,000 to $6,000,000. Livers are the same in England and the
United States. Skin vulnerability is the same, pain and suffering is
the same. So we are dealing here with a multinational battering ram
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under the pretext of curtailing our legal rights to keep up with the
global competition, to depress some of the most precious advances in
the American democratic system of law. We should always keep that
in mind.
There are larger fish to fry in the global strategies of multinational corporations than simply to deal with the collateral source
rule. And you see now the attack on the tort system is coming piecemeal because it cannot come as a major assault. It is coming piecemeal in the sense of eliminating or restricting joint and several liability, getting rid of the collateral source rule, mandatory periodic
payments, capping pain and suffering, and curtailing contingent fees.
Defense lawyer fees are absolutely outrageous-the biggest single
cost to the insurance companies are defense lawyer fees. This kind of
chipping away continues; for example, punitive damages are slated
for abolition or curtailment, curtailing or ending bad faith cases.
I just collected the recent legislation in your state legislature.
There are something like fifty-one statutes and major judicial decisions all in the direction of limiting liability, providing immunity,
and/or curtailing victim rights. Let me just read you a few of these
quickly.
AB 3992 expands the immunity of local elected officials. AB
3694 (these have been enacted) expands public entity immunity for
land failures. AB 3473 immunizes physicians from liability for obstetrical negligence when on call. AB 1530 permits corporations to
immunize directors and officers from liability to the corporation for
their negligence. I guess Willie Brown, who supported this bill, has
been overly impressed with the recent probity of American corporations and their peccadillos.
AB 1912 immunizes public entities for injuries to third parties
caused by police hot pursuits. That means, if a hot rod police officer,
three years removed from teenagerdom, takes off after three kids in a
car who have not been coming out of a bank with a flaming gun, but
just look a little suspicious, and the kids take off down the street at
70, 80, 90 m.p.h. and smash into a family in a car stopping for a red
light, that family, or what is left of it, cannot sue the municipality.
Chipping away. Constantly chipping away. There is even a bill that
passed that eliminated liability on the part of public entities for police dogs' bites in your state. Another is eliminating most strict liability for injuries caused by prescription drugs-a restrictive statute of
limitations to bar D.E.S. suits. On and on and on. That is strategy
number one, like termites eating into the foundations of this edifice.
Strategy number two is to go after more mackerel. For example,
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a state of the art defense becomes more flexible and permissible.
They are all negligent, therefore, no one is negligent. Compliance
with government safety standards is a defense against liability. They
will set up all these phony, little regulatory standards along with the
others, and they will say, "Look, we adhere to this 1967 or 68 tire
standard." This is a defense against products liability eventually destroying or eliminating the role of the civil jury and putting the
whole process in a kind of compensatory board; there is the end of
the tort law system in its multiple and functional contributions to
justice in our society.
Let me say this. There is often a society that has a lot of injustice and no rebellion. The rebellion comes when the injustice is perceived. It is not enough just to have injustice. It has to be perceived.
The perception of injustice is rising in this country, and I feel that
pulse around the nation, against industrial malice and negligence,
against toxic chemicals in the workplace, in the environment, against
the choking and corrosive effects of urban air pollution, the children
who are now in schools, fifteen million of them, with asbestos exposure, the kind of indoor pollution and harm that is coming to chemically sensitive people whose roles are growing by leaps and bounds,
the injustice felt when people are damaged by sudden acceleration in
the vehicle, and the company says it is their fault that they hit the
wrong pedal. They have said this to a number of police officers who
are not known to hit the wrong pedal. Then they see how difficult
the state legislatures and the courts are making access to justice after
the blood is spilled. It is bad enough that access to justice for deterrence and prevention is being blocked by deregulation. And this anger is building and building, you saw part of it in Proposition 103.
The plea has to be that generation of Americans ruling this
country, corporate and government, all three branches, become more
statesmanlike, become more far-seeing, to recognize that the best
type of economic demand to cultivate in a society is the economic
demand for justice. They must know that the concentration of power
and wealth, the ossification of bureaucracy, the domination of our
economy by global multinationals is not being lost among the people.
The biggest mistake rulers can make in this country, whether they
have robes, political action committees, money or executive suites, is
to think that these injustices are not being registered in the minds of
people. They are not cumulative, and they are not waiting for an
explosion to occur-a very modest example of which was Proposition
103, where less than two million dollars defeated 80 million dollars
and a massive apparatus behind the propositions that failed as well.
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Let me put it another way. I have just been meeting with young
canvassers all over the state of California, who are determined to
make sure that Proposition 103 is implemented, who are determined
to make sure that the multi-billion dollar juggernaut called the insurance industry becomes the sentinel for health and safety on the
front lines dealing with toxics, product safety, and condition safety in
the workplace/marketplace. And I can say this, that if those men
and women in their sixties do not reflect the wisdom that they are
capable of, then those men and women in their twenties are going to
reflect the outrage of which they are fully capable. We are not being
led by sufficient people of stature but by those who have more power
than they can responsibly exercise, and who have such a shallow
understanding of history. How even in corporate pragmatic terms
the proliferation of justice, access, voice, and the decentralization of
power have proven that they are the principal contributors to an expanding economy and prosperity compared to those countries who
have none of these expansions. While they sit on great natural resources, they have wallowed in misery, poverty and brutality for centuries. The awareness level of people vis-a-vis these physical assaults
on their security and their children is increasing, and it is not just
street crime.
As this awareness increases, what are we seeing? California going backwards. Having once led the country in the evolution of the
common law of compassion and distributive justice, it is now going
backwards in terms of legislation, restricting the rights of victims to
have their day in court, going backwards in terms of one judicial
decision after another. What could possibly be the justification for
the rampant misuse of the decertification process by the Supreme
Court of California? No opinion? What is a court without an opinion? It is a court that rules by fiat.
There is also regression in terms of too many professorate and
scholarly courts. I have a test for intellectual sincerity, even though it
expansively disagrees with my own position. It is composed of two
parts. Does the professor who stands up before the tort law class
exercising the Socratic method, which is a game only one can play,
and starts injecting the fertile minds of the law students with the
ridiculous, mythical doctrines of the Chicago School of Economics-does that professor have an alternative proposal to prevent
death, injury and property damage under the rule of law? Or is that
professor mostly interested in excoriating the Prossers, the Seaveys,
the Cardozos, the Brandeises, and more judges of late?
The second part of the test is, has that professor ever actually
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spent time with victims? Has he or she gone into the wards? Have
they seen what has happened to the victims of Murr 29 and to the
barely breathing victims of asbestos-probably the biggest industrial
criminal coverup in our history? Have they walked ever so slowly
with the quadraplegics to listen how they have to get up in the
morning and what they have to do before they are functioning?
Perhaps there is a third part of the test, and that is, how does
that law professor spend his or her moonlighting time? Are they consulting with these corporations? Or are they consoling and advising
victims? Are they representing perpetrators or are they defending
victims? I am almost at the outer reach of my disgust with the monetized minds that I see in the halls of academe and on too many
benches. They are empirically starved and therefore their empathy is
at a very low ebb. And when you are empirically starved and your
empathies are at a very low ebb, the intellect can carry you into the
most wild of orbits.
The tort system is not the only institution that can be devised by
the minds of human beings to deal with these issues. But in a period
of our history when so many doors are closed to the voices, the compensations, and the participation of victims, we should be very glad
that we still have the decentralized common law of torts reflecting
experience and not reflecting political action campaign monies the
way the legislatures do. Indeed, the courtroom is the most decentralized form of decision making in our legal system. And while many
doors may be closed to a point of view, against expanding the common law of liability, one door may be open, and that one door leads
to many other doors.
What I think we need to recognize is that human beings are not
chattels, so that when they are damaged all they are paid is out-ofpocket expenses. The worst part of an injury is not your medical
bills, is it? It is not your lost wages, is it? It is your pain and suffering. That is the worst part. Any form of alternative sets of rights and
remedies to eliminate the right to compensation for pain and suffering dehumanizes that human being and turns that human being into
a comparative chattel, like so many damaged cars or damaged
homes.
Whenever we evaluate the tort system and its alternatives we
must start with the victims and get a good quantitative grasp on
them and then work from there. We should not start from some
highly abstracted theory with phony cost assumptions, with dismissed benefit appraisals, and try to replace the common evolution of
the transfer of human experience into principles of applied justice.
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Just for your references, on loss prevention I had an article in
the Suffolk Law Journal about a year ago, which goes through the
insurance company's history on loss prevention and what is needed.
The compilation of state statutes is in my testimony before the California State Legislature two days ago, for those of you who want
that list. And finally, I would focus your attention on the volumes of
Congressional hearings, both the House and the Senate, which have
many good sources of information and citations and should be in
your University library. Thank you very much.

